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Why is it that state-centered recognition of the public sphere has prevailed in Turkey 
during the last decade? The frame analysis of the “public sphere” discourse during 
the 2002-2009 period revealed that the contingency of the discourse on the Islamic 
headscarf issue discouraged an essential understanding of the authentic public 
sphere. Secularists framed the public sphere as a politically neutral arena that must 
be protected by the state. By contrast, pro-Islamists initially counter-framed the 
public sphere positively, in line with the Habermasian definition. Yet, in the face of 
stiff opposition from the secularists, the pro-Islamists came to adopt a negative 
counter-frame implying that the public sphere impinged on the freedom of wearing a 
headscarf. As a result, both the secularists’ and pro-Islamists’ frames entrenched the 
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In Turkey, the expression kamusal alan (the Turkish phrase for public sphere) began to be used in 
academic circles after the early 1990s and among the public at large after 2002.
1 In Turkey’s 
academic circles, kamusal alan is used as a Turkish translation of “public sphere”
2 (German: 
Öffentlichkeit) as conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas
3 whereas amongst the Turkish public 
generally, kamusal alan is generally interpreted as an area directly or indirectly related to the state, 
as is observed from statements or reports by politicians, bureaucrats, and the mass media. In 2009, 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, stated that prior to the local elections of March 
2009, a ballot station was not a public sphere since poll watchers are not public servants but political 
party representatives (Cumuhuriyet 25/3/2009). A recent survey on discrimination in Turkey (Açık 
Toplum Vakfı-Boğaziçi Üniversitesi 2010) included alternative answers to the question “who 
discriminates in the kamusal alan: the police, the military, or public servants in state institutions?” 
While it is understandably unusual for academic terms to permeate into popular discourse, why did a 
state-centered definition of the public sphere prevail in Turkey society, in a form essentially different 
from its original meaning?   
  Behind the state-centered perception of the public sphere lies the fact that in Turkey a strong 
bureaucratic state (Heper 1985) has controlled the public sphere. During Turkey’s modernization, an 
emerging civil society has been easily absorbed into the state apparatus as an ancillary organization 
(Özbek 2007). Also, the public sphere has been the symbolic arena for modernization and 
secularization, and the state strove for some time to expel religious elements from politics, education, 
and daily practices. After the 1980s, however, when the state gradually loosened its grip on society, 
pro-Islamists made their presence felt and expressed themselves in the public sphere by way of 
universities, the media, and the streets. The secularist elite perceived this as a serious intrusion into a 
public sphere that they saw as essentially secular (Göle 2000, 22-27). Political tension rose mostly 
because both secularists and pro-Islamists sought to control rather than share the public sphere 2 
 
(Sarıbay 2000, 17-28).   
Although the tradition of a strong bureaucratic state might have possibly invited some degree of 
perceptional confusion between the public and the state spheres, it was not the major cause of the 
recent recognition of the concept of kamusal alan within Turkish society. The fact that the Turkish 
legal code does not contain reference to the concept of kamusal alan (Akşit 2009, 15) indicates that 
the perception of a state-centered public sphere did not directly derive from the Turkish state 
system.
4 Also, it is not the case that the public sphere has been misunderstood as the state or 
state-related sphere because translation has somehow changed the original nuance of the term. First, 
although kamu in Turkish is often perceived to mean the state, it is also used with reference to public 
welfare. In this sense, there is no particular reason why the kamusal alan should mean the state 
sphere. Özbek argues that if the adjective kamusal (public) is added in front of the words for state 
activities or institutions, it is because such activities and institutions serve the people, and for no 
other reason (2004b, 30-33). Second, separate translations exist in Turkish for public sphere 
(kamusal alan) and public space (kamusal mekan). In practical usage, the two are often conflated but 
such conceptual overlaps are found even in the usage of the two original terms.
5 
The present paper contends that the major reason for the recent recognition of the concept of 
kamusal alan within Turkish society lies instead in the kamusal alan discourse triggered by 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s speech on Teachers’ Day on November 24, 2002. President Sezer 
claimed that the areas where Islamic headscarves were banned included not only state institutions 
but also places where state ceremonies were carried out, and described this entire area as kamusal 
alan. It was an interpretation that in effect expanded the state sphere into the public sphere (Özbek 
2004c, 515). His statement aroused fierce debates between pro-Islamists and secularists.
6 The 
ensuing processes of discourse provide evidence for elucidating the spread of the state-centered 
definition of public sphere in Turkish society and at the same time reveal that both the pro-Islamic 
and secularist elites and media were not very much interested in the genuine public sphere.   
Several scholars have examined the kamusal alan discourse. Depeli's (2007) analysis of 3 
 
newspaper columns during the autumn of 2003 regarding the headscarf
7 and the public sphere 
showed that so far as secularists and pro-Islamists were concerned, the press became a major arena 
of conflict, rather than a means of communication, with Cumhuriyet representing the secularists and 
Yeni  Şafak and Zaman representing the pro-Islamists. Cindoğlu and Zencirci (2008) analyzed the 
political discourse concerning the headscarf and showed that after the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the central issue shifted from women's rights to religion and 
education to political agents whose wives wear a headscarf, in so doing relegating women 
themselves to the backstage. Yet, none of these studies investigated why the state-centered definition 
of the public sphere had prevailed in Turkey. The present paper seeks to make good this deficiency 
by way of discourse analysis.   
The kamusal alan discourse displays two key features that help to explain why the state-centered 
definition has prevailed. First, the concept of the public sphere, however distorted it might have been, 
suddenly became a subject of public discourse, but the discourse came to an abrupt end after only 
five years. Second, the Habermasian conception of the public sphere, which at first seemed to 
effectively challenge the state-centered definition, was later absorbed by it. These two features 
indicate that the concept of public sphere became distorted in Turkey because the kamusal alan 
discourse developed on the contingency of the Islamic headscarf controversy.   
In short, secularists seeking to preserve the status quo used a discourse frame which implied that 
the state banned the headscarf in the kamusal alan in order to preserve the neutrality of the kamusal 
alan. The pro-Islamists, who challenged this dominant frame, initially resorted to an alternative 
counter-frame based on the Habermasian public sphere, describing it as open to everyone in society 
and tolerant of the expression of various ideas. Yet because they faced stiff opposition from the 
secularists, the pro-Islamists failed to persist in the use of the alternative counter-frame and came to 
use more frequently a negative counter-frame implying that the state-centered kamusal alan 
impinged on the freedom of the individual to wear a headscarf. Although valid as a means of 
criticizing the secularists, use of this negative counter-frame entrenched the perception and 4 
 
recognition of the state-centered kamusal alan in Turkish society. Since the kamusal alan discourse 
dissipated after 2007 because of a lull in the headscarf issue, this state-centered understanding of the 
public sphere remained unchanged.   
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the research design, based on discourse 
analysis, is elaborated. The third section draws on quantitative and qualitative analysis of the politics 
of discourse concerning the definition of the public sphere by secularists and pro-Islamists. The final 
section concludes the study by drawing together the points made in the main body of the paper. 
  
 
2 Research Design 
 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the analytical framework, the data sources, and the 
coding rules on which the research was based. In brief, critical discourse analysis has been applied to 
the debate on definitions of kamusal alan using a newspaper database compiled by the Turkish 
parliamentary library. The major focus of interest in the analysis consists of (1) the contingency of 
the discourse on a larger political context and (2) an evaluation of the ways in which and the extent 
to which the challengers (pro-Islamic politicians and media) were able to develop an effective 
counter-discourse against the defenders (the secularist state-elite and media) throughout the period of 
the controversy concerned. 
 
2.1  Discourse and frames   
The research applies critical discourse analysis that focuses on dialectic processes of discourse. 
Critical discourse analysis departs from Michel Foucault’s deterministic understanding of power and 
instead highlights contingent strategies that often appear inconsistent and self-contradictory. This is 
because the discourse process involves competition, often of an unequal kind, among political actors 5 
 
(Hardy and Phillips 2004, 304). In the case of Turkey, the contingency of the strategies and of 
political competition are also relevant. This is because the kamusal alan controversy was only 
secondary to a more general debate on secularism versus religious freedom. For these reasons, when 
the headscarf controversy calmed down, the elite’s and the public’s interest in kamusal alan subsided. 
Also, although the 2002 general elections brought about the first pro-Islamic single-party 
government in Turkey, the presidency and the judiciary were dominated by secularists. In other 
words, there was political competition between the secularists and pro-Islamists. The status quo 
oriented secularists employed legal arguments and insisted on strict application of the headscarf ban 
in state institutions and other vaguely defined non-private areas. The challengers, pro-Islamists, 
initially resorted to universalistic and pluralistic arguments and demanded the freedom of the 
individual to wear a headscarf. Although the pro-Islamists held the legislative majority, the 
implementation of the existing law was left to the judiciary, and the judiciary was dominated by 
secularists. Even if the government were to change the law, it was still possible for a secularist 
President to refer the newly approved law to a constitutional review. The political competition 
therefore favored the secularists over the pro-Islamists.   
In the analysis of contingent strategies, particular attention is paid to what kinds of frames have 
been used to advance the assertions made by either side.
8 Frames “help to render events or 
occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action…by 
simplifying and condensing” features of the real world (Benford and Snow 2000, 614).
9 On the 
assumption of contingent strategies, challengers have limited freedom to strategically create and 
manipulate frames. In reality, frames emerge and transform themselves through interactive 
discursive processes while the extent of framing also varies with the contentiousness of the 
assertions made by the actors. Under unequal competition,
10   dominant frames in society 
significantly affect the course of discourse by circumscribing, while not determining, the possible 
option for the establishment of counter-frames. Steinberg (1999a) demonstrated that working people 
(silk weavers and cotton spinners) in nineteenth century England adopted the language of bourgeois 6 
 
discourse (capitalist and Christian) to contend that labor was the most important creator of wealth 
and that workers had a property right to labor. Steinberg (1999b, 751) also emphasized the dialogic 
and recursive nature of public discourse between power-holders and challengers and demonstrated 
that “challengers seek to de-legitimate hegemonic [speech] genres within a field while appropriating 
pieces to inflect it with their own subversive meanings.” The other side of the coin, however, is that 
“challengers generally remain captive within hegemonic genres” (Steinberg 1999b, 753). 
The above analytical framework suggests that in the kamusal alan debate that was unleashed 
under unequal political competition, the pro-Islamist challengers were expected to adapt to their own 
advantage the dominant frame advocated by the secularists rather than to invent an alternative frame 
of their own. The current analysis is an attempt to test the validity of the conventional analytical 
framework for discourse politics under unequal competition. The following subsection gives details 
of the data sources and coding rules for this analysis.   
 
2.2  Data Sources and Coding Rules 
The author coded a newspaper database created by the Library of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly. The database covered a total of 66 national and local newspapers since 1997 and was 
coded according to topic. From this database the librarians extracted for the author articles whose 
topics included the kamusal alan and placed these articles into a text file.
11 The author deleted 
articles that did not refer to the kamusal alan or those that dealt with countries other than Turkey. 
The resultant text file, consisting of 533 articles, was coded by the author according to the following 
four items and edited as the Newspaper Dataset. 
First, newspaper ideology was coded 1 for secularist (including socialist) newspapers such as 
Birgün, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Vatan, and Yeniçağ, 2 for centrist, liberal, or catch-all 
sources such as Akşam, Radikal, Sabah, and Star, and 3 for pro-Islamic or socially conservative 
newspapers such as Anadolu’da Vakit, Bugün, Halka ve Olaylara Tercüman, Milli Gazete, Yeni Asır, 
Yeni Şafak, and Zaman. 7 
 
Second, article type was coded 1 for news articles (haber) and 2 for column articles (köşe yazısı) 
or other articles. (However, if a column or other non-news article quoted any remark containing the 
phrase kamusal alan, then that article was coded 1 instead of 2). News articles mainly report events 
and provide relatively little interpretation. Column articles are written by columnists who reveal their 
own views and interpretations of recent events. Other articles include interviews, conversations, and 
so forth that convey views of particular individuals. Regarding the citation style, the author of each 
column article is shown but not that of each news article, authors of which the newspaper database 
did not record. 
Third, the implicit or explicit definition of kamusal alan presented in the article was coded 1 for 
state-centered definition, 2 for a definition based on Habermas’s theory, and 3 for the rejection or 
criticism of the current definition without advancing an alternative to replace it. In the case of a news 
article, these definitions are either explicitly or implicitly used by “speakers” (persons quoted in the 
article) who consist largely of politicians or higher-ranking bureaucrats; or by the newspaper reporter 
who described what those politicians or bureaucrats did. If there is more than one speaker to which 
the news article refers, only the first speaker in the news article is considered as the speaker in the 
news item concerned. Some news articles did not contain quotes from persons referring to kamusal 
alan but were written by newspaper reporters who described events with reference to kamusal alan. 
These cases were also recorded in the dataset since they represented the participation of the media in 
the debate. While one might object to the idea of treating speakers’ definitions on all fours with those 
of newspaper reporters, the decision to quote speakers reflects the judgment of the newspaper or its 
reporter. For instance, pro-Islamic newspapers tend to quote the statements of pro-Islamists rather 
than those of secularists and vice versa. It therefore makes a good deal of sense to combine speakers’ 
and newspapers’ (or their reporters’) definitions of kamusal alan. A more pragmatic reason was the 
need to avoid further division of a sample that was of limited size. In the case of a newspaper 
column, these definitions are either explicitly or implicitly used by the columnist.   
 8 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Fourth, newspaper articles that contained either explicit or implicit definitions of kamusal alan 
were coded according to their frames into 1 for the dominant frame, 2 for the alternative 
counter-frame, and 3 for the negative counter-frame (Table 1). For purposes of the research, the 
dominant frame was defined as a frame arguing that the kamusal alan consists of the state sphere 
and all of the non-private sphere of society and that the state legally exercises its authority to secure 
the neutrality of the kamusal alan. The alternative counter-frame was defined as one contending that 
the kamusal alan, which is open to all members of society, is where various ideas are expressed 
freely. The negative counter-frame , by contrast, claimed that in the kamusal alan the state prohibits 
religious expression and discriminates against believers. These three frames are essentially ideal 
types; not all references to the kamusal alan adopted these frames explicitly. When the frame of a 
given article was not sufficiently explicit, the article was coded according to which of the three 
frames it seemed closest to. As Table 1 shows, however, while the dominant frame and negative 
counter-frame assumed a state-centered definition, the alternative counter-frame assumed only the 
Habermasian definition. The coding work therefore required only to divide the articles that adopted 
the state-centered definition into those accommodating dominant frames and negative 
counter-frames. In identifying the frame used in news articles, the same rules applied as in 
identifying the definition of kamusal alan; the speaker’s frame was primarily recorded and when 
there was no speaker, the frame adopted by the newspaper reporter was recorded. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In the main section, which follows, combined numbers of news and column articles are shown, 
except for the first introductory figure (Figure 1), because the shares of news and column articles 
vary according to newspaper ideology. The secularist newspapers that support the current headscarf 9 
 
ban allocated more newspaper space to news articles that reported as facts President Sezer’s 
statements and court decisions than did the contentious pro-Islamic and catch-all centrist newspapers, 
which were more intent than the secularist newspapers on interpreting events with more frequent use 
of column articles (Table 2). This observed tendency is consistent with the previous finding that the 
contentious media is more active in framing than the mainstream media (Clawson et al. 2003).
12 
Although news articles were dominated by the statements of news-related events, the fact that the 
newspaper reported those statements and the frequency of such reports indicates that the newspaper 
did recognize the kamusal alan definition in the statements either positively, negatively, or naturally 
to varying degrees. Taking into consideration these conditions, graphs were drawn of aggregated, not 
separate, numbers of news and column articles. 
 
 
3 Discursive Politics of the Public Sphere: Secularist versus. Pro-Islamic Elites 
and Newspapers 
 
This section begins with summary statistics of the discourse processes and of the frames that 
highlight the two features of the discourse. A more elaborate qualitative analysis of discourse politics 
follows, and corroborates the statistical findings and deepens their interpretation. In brief, this 
section examines the kamusal alan debate between the secularist and pro-Islamic elites between 
2002 and 2009 and the media’s role in stimulating and in reflecting the debate. 
 
3.1  A statistical overview of discourse processes and frames 
The two features of the kamusal alan discourse, to reiterate, are as follows. First, the discourse 
process suddenly erupted and came to an abrupt end. Figure 1 shows the number of news and 
column articles by year.
13 In the current Turkish case, the frequency of newspaper articles (news 
articles and column articles) suddenly rose after President Sezer’s speech on 24th November 2002 10 
 
but fell sharply toward the end of Sezer’s presidential term, after which, in October 2007, the AKP’s 
candidate, Abdullah Gül, was elected President. Presumably, the kamusal alan discourse for the first 
time significantly exposed the Turkish public to the expression of kamusal alan. The numbers of 
column and news articles are also closely associated, which suggests that the debate between the 
secularist and pro-Islamic elites stimulated arguments by columnists. Second, the state-centered 
definition of kamusal alan recaptured the discourse in its closing stages even though the 
Habermasian definition and criticism of the state-centered definition emerged in the middle of the 
debate. Figure 2 shows the percentage of newspaper articles by each definition of kamusal alan by 
year. The percentage of articles employing the state-centered definition, dropped in 2003 and 2004, 
but increased again afterwards. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
  The above two features account for the spread of the state-centered definition of kamusal alan 
in Turkey. First, the public discourse of kamusal alan did raise public awareness of this hitherto 
unknown concept. Yet the discourse did not revolve around the essence of the public sphere but was 
contingent on the headscarf controversy. As the headscarf controversy subsided, the kamusal alan 
debate came to a close. Another reason is that, as the temporary nature of the discourse suggests, it 
was far from diverse in terms of issues and participants. The discourse took place between the 
secularist and pro-Islamic elites with little participation by civil society actors. Newspaper articles 
that referred to statements or actions primarily by civil society organizations were extremely rare. 
This was because the kamusal alan debate was remotely associated with arguments for discursive 
activities by various societal actors and specifically focused on the kind of places where women 
should be allowed to wear headscarves. The discourse thus failed to show its potential benefits of 
promoting freedom of thought and democratization among diverse social groups. 
 11 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
  S e c o n d ,  t h e  kamusal alan controversy ended up with an overwhelming recognition of the 
state-centered definition because the pro-Islamists, who strongly opposed it, switched their 
counter-frame from an alternative one that proposed an ideal definition in positive terms, to a 
negative one that accused the state-centered definition of being oppressive. The pro-Islamists’ shift 
of framing can be seen in Figure 3, which shows that there was an increase in the relative importance 
of the state-centered definition following the switch to the use by pro-Islamic newspapers of the 
negative frame. Figure 4 shows that even among pro-Islamic newspapers, after the introduction of 
negative framing, there was an increase in the proportion of articles that used the state-centered 
definition. The switch to the negative was marked by newspapers beginning to convey distorted 
interpretations in which news reports concerning the wearing of headscarves were presented as 
kamusal alan issues even though the individuals mentioned in the articles made no reference to 
kamusal alan. The remaining part of this section offers a qualitative analysis of the kamusal alan 
controversy in terms of the President’s proclamation of the state-centered definition, the Prime 
Minister’s advocacy of the “real” kamusal alan, the reversion to the state-centered definition, and the 
quick closure that followed. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
 
3.2  The President’s definition of a state-centered public sphere: the dominant frame 
The AKP won the general elections on November 3, 2002 and went on to form Turkey’s first single 
party pro-Islamic government. In the run-up to the election, the AKP had vaguely promised that it 12 
 
would address the issue of religious freedom
14 including the headscarf ban in university.
15 The 
party leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, could not run for office due to his former conviction for inciting 
religious hatred among Turkish citizens. Only after the relevant constitutional change and following 
a by-election that had been arranged for him was he able to become Prime Minister, and he duly 
replaced the provisional Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül, in March 2003.   
During the brief period of leadership vacancy, Parliamentary Speaker Bülent Arınç, more radical 
than Erdoğan and Gül in the “troika” of the AKP leadership, came forward to address the headscarf 
issue. On November 20, 2002 when Arınç saw off President Sezer and his wife at Ankara airport 
(Arınç acted as deputy President during Sezer’s absence), Arınç brought along his wife, who wore a 
headscarf. Secularist newspapers raised concerns that the headscarf had entered state protocol 
(Hürriyet; Milliyet; Cumhuriyet 21/11/2002) while Hürriyet cited a source from the constitutional 
court that the headscarf was forbidden in the kamusal alan, defined as “state offices, universities, 
public institutions and organizations, and official farewell ceremonies” (Hürriyet 21/11/2002).   
  Shortly after the incident, President Sezer in a speech on National Education Day on  
November 24 warned against the emergence of the headscarf controversy by saying that “the 
question of whether or not headscarves can be allowed in the kamusal alan has been solved by the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court. The Court found the wearing of headscarves unconstitutional 
the legal measure that liberalized headscarves in higher educational institutions and annulled it.” 
This statement formed a “critical discourse moment,” and opened the way for the development of the 
kamusal alan controversy in Turkey.
16 In response, Speaker Arınç argued on November 30 that in 
the kamusal alan, which he interpreted as the arena where public service was provided, headscarves 
could be banned for those who supplied public services but not for those who were the recipients of 
such services. Arınç thus initially assumed Sezer’s definition of kamusal alan and argued for at least 
a partial lifting of the headscarf ban, a cause that was supported by most of the pro-Islamic 
newspapers.  
In other words, at the beginning of the debate, the pro-Islamic politicians and newspapers were 13 
 
bent on supporting a limited struggle for students on the campus but conceded that public servants in 
office should not be allowed to wear a headscarf. This stance was adopted while using a negative 
counter-frame alleging that freedom of religion was being suppressed in the state-centered kamusal 
alan. Yet Arınç’s assertion, apparently circumscribed though it may have been, met with a rebuke 
from the secularists. On April 23, 2003 President Sezer, the general chiefs of staff, and the secularist 
main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) boycotted a 
reception hosted by Speaker Arınç to mark the start of the new legislative year .   
The kamusal alan controversy gained momentum in late 2003 through “the reception crisis” that 
was triggered by the decision of  the President not to invite to the Republic Day reception any 
wives of politicians who wore headscarves. Prior to the reception for Republic Day (October 29), 
President Sezer’s view was described on the understanding that the presidency formed part of the 
state sphere, that the Constitutional Court had banned headscarves in the kamusal alan, and that 
headscarves had also been banned within the presidency. On October 23 Parliamentary Speaker 
Arınç claimed that neither the constitution nor the law defined the kamusal alan. On October 30, the 
president of the Court of Accounts, Mehmet Damar, was asked by an opposition member in a 
parliamentary committee meeting why he had not attended the Republic Day reception. In reply, 
Damar, whose wife had not been invited because she wore a headscarf, asserted that he did not 
acknowledge the kamusal alan. In another incident, in the Supreme Court on November 6, one of the 
defendants was ordered by the head of the Fourth Chamber, Fadıl İnan, to leave the courtroom 
because she had worn a headscarf. On November 7, the president of the Supreme Court, Eraslan 
Özkaya, defended İnan’s decision by claiming that courts were a primary example of the kamusal 
alan, within which the law must be applied. 
 
3.3  Growing controversy in the media: unverified reporting and distorted interpretation 
Although the Constitutional Court struck down a law to allow the wearing of headscarves in 
universities, it did not explicitly state that the headscarf was banned in the kamusal alan. It was 14 
 
therefore President Sezer’s own personal interpretation that headscarves were banned in the kamusal 
alan, and not a citation of a decision of the Court.
17 Nevertheless, secularist newspapers cited 
President Sezer’s and other law professionals’ remarks and took the lead in the kamusal alan debate. 
Hürriyet (21/11/2002) referred to an employee of the constitutional court who said that case laws  
showed that headscarves were forbidden in the kamusal alan, which included places where official 
ceremonies were held. The same newspaper introduced a remark by Süheyl Batum, the dean of the 
law faculty at Bahçeşehir University, who defined the kamusal alan as a situation and area in the 
state exercises its dominant authority (Hürriyet 26/11/2002). Soysal (2004), a prominent 
constitutional scholar and former parliamentarian, argued in his Cumuhuriyet column that the whole 
of the sphere outside one’s own home is the kamusal alan. Just like President Sezer, these “law 
experts” put forth their definitions without any reference to the exact sources on which their 
statements were based.   
  Media references to a state-centered kamusal alan began to appear more frequently. Not only 
the secularists but also centrist media adopted this definition without serious scrutiny and initiated 
the kamusal alan account of events surrounding the headscarf issue. Ayşen Zeybekçi, the wife of 
Denizli Mayor from the AKP, took part in the National Sovereignty and Children’s Day celebrations 
on April 23, 2004 without wearing her headscarf, saying that she acted according to the law 
pertaining to public and official ceremonies. Despite the fact that she did not utter the words 
“kamusal alan,” this act was interpreted by the secularist Hürriyet (24/11/2004), one of whose 
headlines described Zeybekçi’s appearance without her headscarf as the first (positive) step in the 
kamusal alan (Kamusal alanda ilk adım), and the newspaper interpreted the event as acceptance of 
the official (secular) dress code appropriate for the kamusal alan. The decision by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR 2004) in June 2004 that rejected a Turkish female student’s appeal 
against the headscarf ban was also misrepresented by the secularist and centrist media as being 
linked to the kamusal alan. Even though the court did not use the phrase “kamusal alan,” 
Cumhuriyet (30/6/2004) reported that the court unanimously supported Turkey’s ban on the 15 
 
headscarf in the kamusal alan. The secularist or centrist newspapers thereafter repeatedly referred to 
the ECHR’s ruling, though often without specifying the circumstances or the date, as though it were 
a ban on the wearing of headscarves in the kamusal alan (For instance, see Akşam (06/6/2005)). 
    On the other hand, pro-Islamic columnists and some centrist columnists initially objected to the 
state-centered definition of kamusal alan by using daily examples rather than arguing in support of 
the Habermasian or society-centered definition.
18 Göktürk (2003) and others pointed out that if the 
court was part of the kamusal alan, then so were tax offices, hospitals, and marriage chambers, yet 
headscarves were not banned in these public institutions. These writers argued that the headscarf ban 
in the kamusal alan was carried out by arbitrary definitions. Mehmet Yılmaz, a secularist columnist 
in the secularist newspaper Milliyet, changed his view from opposing headscarves outside the private 
sphere (Yılmaz 2002a) to accepting headscarves to be worn by the recipients of public services 
provided by the state, in line with what Arınç had proposed (Yılmaz 2002b).   
There were a few columnists who adopted the Habermasian definition of kamusal alan.
19 
Erdoğan (2002), a liberal scholar, argued that the kamusal alan was not a legal term but a term 
belonging to political philosophy. In Turkey, he argued, the state elite described something as public 
in order to expand the state sphere at their own discretion. Berzeg (2003) pointed out that the world 
order consists of three spheres: private, social or public, and state, and claimed that President Sezer’s 
usage of the kamusal alan wrongly merged the spheres of state and society. Kahraman (2003) 
defined public space (used by him interchangeably with kamusal alan) as where people get together 
and engage in interaction, and considered it wrong to justify the confinement of religious symbols to 
the private sphere by reference to the kamusal alan. Kahraman (2004) also expressed the view that 
the kamusal alan controversy was internally deadlocked due to poor understanding of the nature of 
liberalism and republicanism. What was important, according to him, was not to debate the 
headscarf and the kamusal alan based on one’s own ideas, but to draw lessons so as to reorganize the 
relationship between state and society.   
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3.4  Prime Minister’s advocacy of the “real” public sphere: an alternative counter-frame 
Prime Minister Erdoğan initially kept a low profile with regard to the kamusal alan controversy in 
order to minimize friction with the secularist elite at an early stage in the existence of the new 
government.
20 Although party supporters and some of the AKP parliamentarians were disgruntled 
over the government’s seeming reluctance to solve the headscarf issue despite the fact that the 
government controlled a two-thirds parliamentary majority that would have enabled constitutional 
amendment without resort to a referendum, Erdoğan and the party leadership believed that any legal 
or constitutional change for narrowing down the definition of kamusal alan or for allowing headscarf 
wearing would raise political tensions in society and in government institutions. The leadership thus 
hoped to “settle this controversy without looking as if they were giving concessions” (Çetin 2003). 
In fact, Erdoğan did try to fulfill one of his electoral promises by introducing a bill to lift the 
disadvantages for students of vocational high schools, including imam-hatip schools, who sought to 
enter university, but President Sezer vetoed the proposal. Erdoğan’s legislative majority was such 
that he could have easily overridden the veto. His refusal to use his majority to overturn the veto was 
criticized at a meeting organized by the Unity Foundation (Birlik Vakfı), a powerful interest group of 
the graduates and parents supporting imam-hatip schools, but Erdoğan defended his decision by 
saying that his “government was not ready to pay the price [of legislation against staunch secularist 
opposition]” nor can he “have the students pay the same price” (Cumhuriyet 4/7/2004).   
On June 27, 2004, President Sezer invited Prime Minister Erdoğan and other Ministers for the 
dinner at the Dolmabahçe Palace museum during the NATO summit in Istanbul but made it clear that 
Ministers whose wives insisted on wearing headscarves would not be asked to attend. This incident 
humiliated the Prime Minister in front of world leaders and forced him to take a position on the 
kamusal alan issue, if not on the headscarf issue directly. Erdoğan declared on July 9 that the 
Dolmabahçe Palace was outside the kamusal alan and claimed that there was no analogy of the 
interpretation of the kamusal alan among the developed countries. In response, the president of the 
Higher Education Council and a professor of law, Erdoğan Teziç, argued that the kamusal alan was 17 
 
not a geographical definition but a functional one. He asserted that in a private sphere such as a park, 
if a policeman asks a person to show identification, then the park would become part of the kamusal 
alan (Akşam, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet 11/7/2004). Erdoğan went further, and claimed at a parliamentary 
group meeting that the kamusal alan was “a sphere that enables different individuals, different social 
groups, and different ideas to coexist and compete in a civilized and democratic way…. The mistake 
made in Turkey is to define the kamusal alan only in spatial terms. However, this sphere is not the 
state sphere, as some have imagined. Neither does it mean spaces that belong to the state or where 
public servants are found.” (Hürriyet 14/7/2004).
21 Parliamentary Speaker Arınç taking a similar 
stance, said on July 15 that neither the constitution nor the law gave a definition of the kamusal alan, 
which he characterized in terms of “a free reflection of differences on a common ground 
(farklılıkların bir arada özgürce yansımasıdır).”  
While almost all the pro-Islamic and liberal newspapers praised Erdoğan’s advocacy of the 
Habermasian definition, secularist newspapers sneered at the “180 degree change” (Cumhuriyet 
15/7/2004) relative to his previous remark, made in 2002, that if he came into government, he would 
ban alcohol in the kamusal alan but let restaurants and pubs serve it in the usual way (Akşam 
14/2/2002). In this statement Erdoğan presumably meant by the kamusal alan official or state-owned 
space.
22  His about-face was a product of his party’s attempts to find an appropriate definition of the 
kamusal alan, launched after the disappointing verdict of the ECHR as well as in the aftermath of the 
Dolmabahçe incident. After the ECHR’s decision on the wearing of headscarves, the AKP’s central 
decision and administrative council decided to examine ways to narrow the scope of the kamusal 
alan (Cumhuriyet 4/7/2004) The party apparently could not find such a restrictive definition of the 
kamusal alan but instead came up with the society-centered Habermasian definition, which was the 
most widely accepted version of the public sphere.   
 
3.5  Reversion to the state-centered definition: a negative counter-frame 
While Erdoğan tried to redefine the kamusal alan, the secularist state elite remained stubborn. 18 
 
President Sezer repeated the previous year’s practice of refusing to invite to the Republic Day 
reception the wives of parliamentarians and state officials who wore headscarves. The president of 
the Constitutional Court, Mustafa Bumin, speaking on the court’s 43rd anniversary on April 25, 2005, 
said that any law that allowed headscarves for university students and public servants would be 
judged unconstitutional.
23 In fact, in Erzurum Atarürk University on June 14, the mother of a 
graduate was not admitted to the diploma ceremony because she wore a headscarf. These incidents 
were reported without any specific reference to the kamusal alan but newspaper columns presented 
accounts on the basis of the kamusal alan controversy. These included statements such as “Today, 
the majority regard the kamusal alan as the area where various forms of state authority are exercised 
and President Sezer probably thinks that way (Mangırcı 2004);” “Bumin’s statement reduced the 
possibility of [women] being able to wear headscarves in the kamusal alan (Sarıkaya 2005);” and 
“the graduation ceremony hall is not (a part of) the kamusal alan (Kakinç 2005).”   
At the same time, in June 2005 the media turned to the discussion of who would be likely to be 
elected President in May 2007. The Turkish constitution at that time allowed a President elected by 
parliament to serve for only one term of seven years. The major concern was what would happen to 
an AKP-backed candidate if his wife wore a headscarf because according to President Sezer’s claim, 
the presidential residence was widely regarded as part of the “kamusal alan”. The discussion was 
triggered by a remark of the former President, Süleyman Demirel, who said in a newspaper 
interview that the current law did not ban the President’s wife from wearing a headscarf but that a 
new law regulating clothing would be necessary (Akşam 6/6/2005).   
Prime Minister Erdoğan confessed to foreigners his distress over what he regarded as secularist 
obstinacy and in this connection, he admitted the prevalence of the state-centered definition of the 
kamusal alan rather than advocating a society-centered definition. Erdoğan argued at his meeting 
with foreign ambassadors that even though the Prime Minister’s Residence formed part of the 
kamusal alan, his wife, who wore a headscarf, stayed there and also participated in all electoral 
campaigns (Sabah 6/6/2005). He also told at a meeting of philosophical organizations in the United 19 
 
States on July 8 that “when it comes to the issue of kamusal alan, there is no definition yet” and that 
“as a matter of fact, [i]t has not been a practice until now to let women wearing headscarves to work 
in the kamusal alan. But our problem is that in universities there is no place for girls with 
headscarves” (Sabah; Radikal 9/7/2005).   
In 2005, the increasing diffusion of the state-centered definition throughout the media and the 
statements of the Prime Minister seemed gradually to settle the controversy. But the kamusal alan 
debate flared up again in early 2006 over a judicial decision concerning the wearing of headscarves. 
The major new aspect of the discourse was the fact that the media widely interpreted the decision in 
kamusal alan terms when in fact the decision did not refer to that concept at all. On February 8, 2006, 
the Council of State (Danıştay) overturned the lower court’s acceptance of a school teacher’s claim 
that her promotion to the directorship of a kindergarten had been cancelled because the photograph 
on her identification card showed her wearing a headscarf. Moreover among the evidence cited was 
that she had been seen going to and from the school with her headscarf on. After the Council of 
State’s decision, accounts of the the kamusal alan spread and intensified in newspapers of every 
kind.  
Many newspapers and columnists described the Council of State’s decision as an expansion of the 
kamusal alan (“even streets have been taken into the kamusal alan”, said one source) despite the fact 
that the Council did not make any reference to the kamusal alan (Danıştay Başkanlığı 2005).
24 In 
particular, pro-Islamic newspapers intensified their criticisms of the kamusal alan to the effect that it 
infringed the freedom of religion. Pro-Islamic newspapers and columnists, in other words, leaned 
toward kamusal alan criticism on the assumption of its state-centered definition rather than insisting 
on the authentic definition and correct interpretation of it (Yeni  Şafak 9/2/2006; Abay 2006; 
Altınyelek 2006). This tendency was further reinforced by reports that gave distorted interpretations 
of the reaction of politicians to the Council of State’s decision. For instance, the conservative Halka 
ve Olaylara Tercüman newspaper (2006) reported that the Council of State’s decision “brought about 
the argument that ‘the kamusal alan is expanding’” while the vice presidents (Emin Şirin and Akif 20 
 
Gülle) and a parliamentarian    of the Motherland Party or ANAP (İbrahim Özdoğan, from Erzurum) 
quoted in the same article did not in fact mention the kamusal alan. Korkut (2006) drew attention to 
the spreading misperception, observing that “[in] general, the kamusal alan is not the state 
authorities’ own sphere but society’s sphere…. When the kamusal alan becomes an issue, the 
recognition that identifies the kamusal alan with the state forms the basic problem.” 
While the media actively framed the Council of State decision with the “kamusal alan” account, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP did not involve themselves to any great extent in the debate. 
Meanwhile, they employed a negative counter-frame that emphasized the restriction of freedom in 
the kamusal alan, thus dropping their earlier alternative counter-frame of the kamusal alan. In a 
speech given on February 11 to a local congress of the AKP in Mersin, Erdoğan said, “For people, 
there are the private sphere, the kamusal alan, and the state sphere. Nobody has the right to push 
people into any of them”, he said, and while not naming it, he criticized the Council of State for 
trying to intervene in people’s homes (Hürriyet; Türkiye 12/2/2006).
25 The government spokesman 
and Justice Minister, Cemil Çiçek, in response to the reminder by the press of interpretations of an 
expanded kamusal alan, said on February 13 that “[t]he kamusal alan term is not a legal term” but 
“more of a concept that is discussed in sociological, ideological, and political science terms” 
(Cumhuriyet; Bugün 14/2/2006). Çiçek’s reference to ideology reflected his distance from even the 
Habermasian, or society-centered, concept of the kamusal alan.
26  Only Parliamentary Speaker Arınç, 
institutionally more independent of the government and essentially more radical, persisted with the 
society-centered definition. Thus at the opening of the new legislative year, he said that “the kamusal 
alan is the sphere where citizens discuss their common problems equally and freely” (Anadolu’da 
Vakit; Bugün, Hürriyet 24/4/2006).
27 
Even after the outburst of public fury over the Council of State decision, pro-Islamic newspapers 
were more intent than AKP politicians on sustaining the kamusal alan debate and continued to report 
daily events as though they were kamusal alan issues. For instance, the pro-Islamic Yeni  Şafak 
(24/05/2006), in an article that described the change toward stricter headscarf regulation on the 21 
 
campus of Gazi University, reported that “the first results of the meeting between President Sezer 
and the 53 state university rectors emerged as a case of ‘more prohibition and more kamusal alan’”. 
While the university did not refer to the kamusal alan, the newspaper framed the news in terms of a 
kamusal alan account. Gönültaş (2006), writing in the conservative Bugün newspaper described as a   
kamusal alan event an incident in which military officers had withdrawn from an official ceremony 
attended by headscarf-wearing women and asked “What name is given to the political regime of a 
country in which everywhere military officers go … is recognized as a ‘kamusal alan’?” In this way, 
with both the defenders and opponents of the headscarf ban referring to the kamusal alan, the 
counter-framing of public discourse by the pro-Islamic media and (to a lesser extent) by politicians 
increasingly shifted the emphasis from an alternative to a negative frame (Coşkun 2007) . 
 
3.6  The closure: legalization of headscarf wearing and secularist counter-offensive 
In 2007, the presidential election, scheduled for May, led to confrontation between the secularists 
and the AKP government over the latter’s candidate, Gül, whose wife wore a headscarf.
28 The  crisis 
led to early general elections in July, and these returned the incumbent with a landslide victory. In 
August, Gül was elected President. It is perhaps the case that during this turbulent period the 
kamusal alan debate was given a lower priority in public discourse. Be that as it may, after that 
period, the kamusal alan debate remained stagnant and came to a virtual end by 2009. There are two 
major reasons for its abrupt termination. First, for both the proponents and opponents of the 
headscarf, the meaning of the kamusal alan lost its significance. After Gül was elected President, 
Mrs. Gül began to reside in the presidential palace, which the secularists regarded as an important 
part of the kamusal alan. This accomplished fact invalidated the secularist discourse that 
headscarves should not be allowed in the kamusal alan. Also, the AKP government, as well as its 
supporters including the pro-Islamic media, was encouraged by the massive growth of its vote 
percentage, from 34.3 percent in 2002 to 46.7 percent in 2007. Now that it enjoyed a commanding 
majority, the AKP tried to introduce a constitutional amendment that would allow university students 22 
 
to wear headscarves. More radical members of the AKP and the media even advocated the wearing 
of headscarves in the institutions of the state (kamu).
29 For pro-Islamic forces, it became less 
necessary than before to condemn the state-centered definition of the kamusal alan or to try to 
change its definition into a society-centered one. The AKP government thus in February 2008 
resorted to amendment of the constitution that was purported to liberalize the wearing of headscarves 
in state universities.   
On the other hand, a more aggressive and explicit desire for headscarf freedom expressed by the 
AKP aroused significant concerns among the secularists and even some liberals over what they 
feared was the increasing Islamization of society, at a time when assertions were being made that 
communal pressure (mahalle baskısı) was on the rise. Milliyet, illustrating its article with 
photographs, alleged that in certain state institutions including hospitals, headscarves were being 
worn by public servants (25/2/2008). This article opened a new controversy as to whether or not 
the headscarf was already being allowed in de facto terms for public servants. Alkan (2008), a liberal 
columnist who had supported headscarf freedom in the universities, expressed his concern that more 
recently, pro-Islamic newspapers as well as an AKP politician were explicitly demanding that 
headscarves should be allowed not only for university students but also for primary and secondary 
school students as well as public servants, a development that would threaten the neutrality principle 
of the state and public services. Thus for both the secularists and pro-Islamists, the focus of the 
headscarf and secular-religious issues moved from the kamusal alan to the state sphere.   
Second, less significantly, the secularist judiciary opened a counter-attack on the AKP government 
thereby temporarily deterring reference to the kamusal alan. On March 14, 2008, soon after the 
constitutional amendment that aimed at lifting the headscarf ban in universities, the Supreme 
Prosecutors’ Office referred to the Constitutional Court for the disbandment of the AKP on various 
charges. The evidence on which the referral was based included a total of 19 statements concerning 
the kamusal alan made by Erdoğan, Arınç and other AKP cadres and parliamentarians (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi 2008). Pending the Court decision on this party closure case, the Constitutional Court 23 
 
annulled the above constitutional amendment which had been referred to the Court by the CHP, on 
June 3, 2008. This decision sounded an alarm to the AKP as regards possible future trends. The 
Court, however, decided in July 29 to penalize the AKP with less severe sanctions than party closure. 
It did find the AKP a focus of anti-secularism but its only response was to suspend half of the annual 
treasury subsidy to the party. Among AKP members’ statements on the kamusal alan that the 
prosecution listed as evidence in support of its charges, the Court regarded two statements of 
Erdoğan, one of Arınç, and one of Kilis parliamentarian Hasan Kara as violating the provisions for 
party closure (Article 68) of the constitution (Anayasa Mahkemesi 2008, 848-869). Thus, the 
kamusal alan references by AKP party members may not have imposed a heavy cost on the party but 
they did provide sufficient evidence to allow the Court to describe the AKP as anti-secular. 
Overall, the kamusal alan controversy failed to generate in Turkey a widespread awareness of a 
society-centered kamusal alan. This is evident even from a recent speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan, 
who earlier advocated a Habermasian kamusal alan. On March 20, 2009, the Higher Election 
Council circulated a note stating that the ballot box area was a kamusal alan element, and that voting 
witnesses must abide by the dress code specified by the law and by judicial decisions. The response 
of Prime Minister Erdoğan, on March 24, was that the ballot box area was not part of the kamusal 
alan and that those who went there were not public servants but political party representatives 
(Cumhuriyet 25/3/2009).  Thus, state institutions still clung to the state-centered definition while 
Erdoğan, who once had opposed it, no longer used the alternative society-centered definition. Since 
the kamusal alan discourse in Turkey was so contingent and dependent on the headscarf controversy, 





It is one thing to say that the state in de facto terms controls the public sphere but quite another to 24 
 
say that the state controls the public sphere de jure. The latter point is more precise and therefore 
easier to deny than the former. What is puzzling for Turkey is that the latter argument has become 
accepted as a fact by both the supporters and opponents of the state-controlled public sphere. It is 
true that headscarves have been banned in universities by judicial and administrative decisions but 
none of those decisions stipulated that headscarves could not be worn in the public sphere. The 
public sphere discourse that was inadvertently started by the President’s self-styled definition of the 
term kamusal alan suddenly aroused exchanges between pro-Islamists and liberals on the one hand 
and secularists on the other. But curiously enough, the initial claim by the President that established 
court decisions banned the wearing of headscarves in the public sphere has not met with serious 
scrutiny from the media. Although pro-Islamists condemned such a definition and the decisions 
based upon it, they assumed that such court decisions remained legally valid, although unjustifiable 
according to the constitution and the law. As a result, any event related to headscarves came to be 
described in terms of the public sphere, even when the court did not refer to the public sphere in its 
decision. It was thus overreaction of the media that reinforced the state-centered definition of the 
public sphere, which the President first presented but later refrained from uttering.   
The  kamusal alan discourse in Turkey was thus contingent and dependent on the headscarf 
controversy and contributed to the permeation of the state-centered definition of the kamusal alan 
into Turkish society in two ways. First, the discourse helped to create a new public awareness of the 
public sphere by placing the concept on the public agenda for the first time. Yet the concept of the 
public sphere became a subject of public discourse primarily because the discourse assumed that the 
freedom or otherwise of the individual to wear a headscarf hinged on how the kamusal alan was 
defined. Thus, when the headscarf issue dropped off the discourse agenda due to a change in 
political circumstances, the kamusal alan discourse also lost momentum. Second, secularists seeking 
to maintain the status quo used a discourse frame implying that the state banned the headscarf in the 
kamusal alan in order to preserve the neutrality of the kamusal alan. The pro-Islamists, who 
challenged this dominant frame, initially resorted to an alternative counter-frame that adopted the 25 
 
Habermasian public sphere, describing it as open to everyone in society and tolerant of the 
expression of various ideas. Yet when they faced stiff opposition from the secularists, the 
pro-Islamists failed to persist in the use of the alternative counter-frame and came to use with 
increasing frequency a negative counter-frame that suggested that the state-centered kamusal alan 
impinged on the freedom to wear a headscarf. Whatever its validity as a criticism of the secularists, 
this negative counter-frame entrenched the perception and recognition of the state-centered public 
sphere in Turkish society. When the kamusal alan discourse petered out around 2009, the 
state-centered understanding of the public sphere was left unchanged. 
The alternative (Habermasian) counter-frame of the kamusal alan discourse put forth by the 
pro-Islamists seems to have lacked resonance primarily due to weak credibility and salience.
30  
Erdoğan introduced the Habermasian definition of kamusal alan in July 2004 and in so doing turned 
out to contradict his earlier definition. His statements thereafter implicitly accepted the 
state-centered definition and shifted to the negative counter-frame. Arınç initially assumed the 
state-centered definition and in a kind of limited struggle, asserted that the recipients of public 
services should be allowed to wear headscarves. Yet, when Erdoğan proposed the society-centered 
(Habermasian) definition, he adopted it and clung to it afterwards. Çiçek understood the kamusal 
alan as a social scientific term but stood aloof by describing it as an ideological concept. These 
pieces of evidence indicate that the alternative counter-frame was not persistently supported by the 
AKP’s leading politicians. The salience (of the alternative counter-frame) so far as targets of 
mobilization (the discourse audience) was concerned was low because it lacked centrality. The 
pro-Islamic discourse revealed that the aim of supporting the Habermasian kamusal alan was to 
solve the headscarf issue; it was not really associated with arguments that the Habermasian kamusal 
alan would contribute to the development of civil society, a greater voice for minority groups, or 
democratization. The discourse thus largely failed to demonstrate to diverse social groups the 
potential benefits of the genuine (Habermasian) kamusal alan.  
The current paper carries two main implications. First, the research, using Turkey as an example, 26 
 
supports the assertion held by contributors to critical discourse analysis that public discourse 
revolves around contingent strategies. The kamusal alan discourse originated from political conflict 
over religious visibility (or headscarf wearing). The accomplished fact of the wearing of headscarves 
in the presidential palace shifted the focal point, or front line, of the visibility issue to the state 
sphere thus removing the relevance of how to define the kamusal alan, for both pro-Islamists and 
secularists. Second, the research confirms the observation that challengers’ counter-frames tend to be 
pragmatically formed by utilizing the dominant frame in one way or another (Steinberg 1999b, 
751-753) with the negative counter-frame (in the case discussed by the paper, “The state-centered 
kamusal alan is repressive”) providing an example. At the same time, in Turkey, the negative 
counter-frame also inherently assumed the state-centered definition of kamusal alan and thus fell 
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1  Despite its theoretical and practical importance, there has been little research on the public sphere 
in Turkey. Previous empirical studies on the public sphere in Turkey have been inexorably linked to 
secularism or have been subservient to it (Göle 1996; Göle 2000; Özdalga 1998; Arat 2005; Çınar 
2005; Azak 2000; Borovalı and Turan 2007; Kuru 2006; Kuru 2007; Kuru 2009; Turam 2007). For 
other discussions of the public sphere in Turkey, see İlyasoğlu (1996), Üstel (1997), Mahçupyan 
(1998), Keyman (1998), Çaha (1998), Türköne (1998), Aktaş (2000), Dağtaş and Dağtaş (2007),   
and Taş (2007). The first Turkish translation of Habermas (1991) was published in 1997 (Habermas 
1997). 
2  In this paper, the public sphere is regarded as existing in the private realm (apart from the sphere 
of public authority) but is distinct from the private sphere, according to Habermas’s schema (1991, 
30). By Habermas's definition, “the bourgeois public sphere was to be a discursive arena in which 27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
'private persons' deliberated about 'public matters,' with the word public meaning either state-related, 
accessible to everyone, of concern to everyone, and pertaining to a common good, or share interests” 
(Fraser 1992, 128). 
3  In Turkey, the academic literature on the public sphere relies most extensively on Habermas 
(Özbek 2004a, 9). 
4  Özbudun (2006), Turkey’s most cited constitutional scholar, also attested that he had never come 
across the term kamusal alan in the Turkish legal code during the previous fifty years of his career. 
5  Smith and Low (2006, 5) distinguish these two concepts by saying that “[t]he public sphere 
remains essentially ungrounded while public space discussions insufficiently connect to mediations 
on the public sphere” 
6  In newspapers, the controversy involved secularists on the one hand and pro-Islamists and liberals 
on the other. Yet, among major political leaders no liberals were found. This is why the research 
presented the controversy in a more simplified way. Pro-Islamic rather than Islamist was used to 
indicate the generally pragmatic and pro-systemic nature of Islamic groups/movements in Turkey 
while not denying that they harbor a limited number of extremist or fundamentalist groups. 
Liberalism is used here in the sense that it “assumes individuals are for the most part motivated by 
self-interest, and regards them as the best judges of what this interest requires” and on the 
assumption that it limits the role of politics to solving differences among individual interests “under 
a supposedly neutral set of constitutional rules” (Dryzek et al 2006, 14-15). In Turkey, liberalism has 
had a close affinity with Islamic thought (Yılmaz 2005; Erdoğan 2005a; Erdoğan 2005b). The 
secularists include the military and the judiciary, as well as secularist political parties and media.     
7  The original Turkish word for headscarf is either başörtüşü or türban. The usage of these two 
Turkish words varies across newspapers. This is mostly because more religiously oriented 
newspapers tend not to use türban but to use başörtüşü for any style of head-garment wearing. Other 
newspapers more often distinguish between başörtüşü as an Anatolian-traditional loose head 
garment and türban as a politically-expressive tight head covering. For these reasons, this paper uses 
headscarf to refer to both başörtüşü and türban . In general, women who cover their heads with a 
türban call it a başörtüşü instead (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009, 163, n 10). 
8  Johnston (2002, 72) points to two differences between frame and discourse analysis applied to 
social movement research. “First, ... [f]raming studies mostly describe collective action frames and 
their role in movement development whereas discourse studies treat cultural processes and their 
effect on what gets talked about. Second,... framing studies offer less reference to the actual texts on 
which the frames are based, while discourse studies tend to analyze texts more closely.” In this 
regard, the current research is primarily based on discourse analysis; frame analysis is used in a 
complementary way to demonstrate discourse dynamics with evidence of frame transformation. 28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
9  The relatively few systematic studies of public discourse with frames include Gamson (1992), 
Ferree et al. (2002), and Fiss and Hirsch (2005). Of these, Gamson’s (1992, 215-257) systematic 
analysis of the impact of media discourse on working-class opinion revealed several frames for each 
of the four major collective action issues in the United States in the 1980s as follows: (1) troubled 
industry: free enterprise, partnership, capital flight, and foreign invasion; (2) affirmative action: 
remedial action, delicate balance, and no preferential treatment; (3) nuclear power: progress, energy 
independence, soft paths, no public accountability, not cost effective, runaway, and Devil’s bargain. 
(4) Arab-Israeli conflict: feuding neighbors, strategic interest, Arab intransigence, Israeli 
expansionism, dual liberalism. These frames were extracted by a three-digit coding of media 
sources. 
10  For more equally competitive situations, Miceli (2005) showed that debate between two groups 
with mutually opposing framings such as morality and identity exacerbated polarization rather than 
encouraged mutual understanding. 
11 The  topic  of  kamusal alan was defined by the library as the issue or sphere where the state uses 
its dominant authority. In fact, however, the database included newspaper articles that referred not 
only to the kamusal alan by this state-centered definition but also articles that contained the 
society-centered definition of kamusal alan. Also, the major focus of this research is on change in 
the relative weight of state-centered and liberal conceptions of kamusal alan in the course of 
controversy rather than their absolute shares. 
12  Clawson and others’ (2003) case study of the media framing of U. S. Supreme Court rulings 
regarding affirmative action showed that the mainstream press reported Court rulings and their 
implications evenhandedly whereas the Black press more on the implications than on the rulings 
themselves.    Framing has thus been more restrained in mainstream newspapers than in contentious 
newspapers (Clawson et al. 2003). 
13  The opening of discourse can be indicated by a “critical discourse moment” that refers to “events 
that stimulate news articles and commentary in various public forms” (Ferree et al. 2002, 24). 
Closure is a discursive norm inherent in representative liberal theory that refers to “a time at which 
all concerned can agree that the matter has been decided and the system moves on” (Ferree et al. 
2002, 210). Ferree et al. (2002, 248) described the latter in operational terms as “a sharp drop in the 
volume of public discourse following authoritative action by state actors.   
14  Most of the literature regarding the AKP characterizes the party as a grouping of conservative 
democrats or Muslim democrats and emphasizes its pragmatic and moderate inclination (Yavuz 
2006; Hale and Özbudun 2010). The AKP in its party program for 2002 revealed its preference for 
the Anglo-Saxon model of secularism over the French model (Tepe 2008, 206). Kuru (2006) and 
Yavuz (2009) are careful to point out, however, that even the AKP’s reformist vision of secularism is 29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
less pluralistic than American secularism since it favors Sunni-hanafi teaching and espouses state 
supervision of Islam by the General Directorate of Religious Affairs. In this sense, the AKP’s general 
assertion that it seeks freedom of religion in the public sphere needs scrutiny on an empirical basis. 
15  During the 2002 general election campaign, the AKP initially did not give high priority to the 
headscarf issue. The most that Erdoğan, the AKP leader, could say was that the AKP would “lift the 
obstacles for education.” Yet, faced with the decision of the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) to take 
issue with the headscarf ban, the AKP became more forthright. On October 18 in Kahramanmaraş, 
in response to a voter’s question about what would happen to the headscarf problem, Erdoğan said, 
“We would become the country of freedoms” while the AKP Parliamentary Group leader, Bülent 
Arınç, more directly said, “It is our moral debt to solve this problem [of the headscarf ban]. We will 
go on until the end” (Yılmaz 2002). 
16  In fact, the use of the kamusal alan terminology by Turkish officials was recorded for the first 
time in the warning suit (ihtar davası) opened by the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office in 2001 
against the AKP (See endnote 20) but this reference to the kamusal alan did not attract much 
attention probably because the concept was not central to the later decision by the Constitutional 
Court to give a warning to the AKP.   
17 Erdoğan (2003) persuasively makes the point that the Constitutional Court has not explicitly 
banned headscarves in the kamusal alan and points out that it was President Sezer who interpreted 
previous Court decisions that banned headscarves in university (March 7, 1989) as a prohibition of 
headscarves in the kamusal alan in general. The Court’s decision that was a warning to the AKP 
included the statement that “[when] members of political parties have been elected to the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, or to the government, or to elective offices of local governments, there 
will be no doubt that they will carry out their public duties in the kamusal alan. In the kamusal alan, 
those who begin their duty will undoubtedly be bound by the costume rules applied there” 
(Translated by the author, Anayasa Mahkemesi (2002), cited in Hasdemir (2006, 193)). But this 
statement was made in a decision of the Court that rejected the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office’s 
request for a Court warning to the AKP, for the reason that even though some of the AKP’s founding 
members wore headscarves, once they became elected officials, they would comply with the 
costume rules. In this sense, there was little ground for arguing that previous court decisions 
established the ban of headscarves in the public sphere, as President Sezer claimed. 
18 The  kamusal alan definition found in these articles was coded as 3, standing for the rejection or 
criticism of the current definition without an alternative to replace it. 
19 The  kamusal alan definition found in these articles was coded as 2, standing for a definition based 
on Habermas’s theory. 
20  Prime Minister Erdoğan had the bitter experience of having been imprisoned for half a year 30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
during the 1998-99 period. Also in 2001, the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office requested the 
Constitutional Court to issue a prior warning of closure against his party. The Court subsequently 
rejected the request. 
21  Özbek (2004c, 520) criticizes Erdoğan, who in his speech on July 13, 2004 equated the kamusal 
alan with civil society, the latter being broader and structurally more diverse than the former. 
22  It can only be speculated that Erdoğan’s state-centered definition of the kamusal alan might have 
drawn on the Public Prosecutors’ Office’s definition, as expressed in its request for a Court warning 
against the AKP (See endnote 16). 
23  Bumin, who was to retire in two months, explained that his statement was a response to appeals 
submitted to the Constitutional Court by headscarf-wearing female students who asked for the 
Court’s view (Sarıkaya 2005). 
24  The decision date refers to when the decision was promulgated, not when the decision was made.   
25  Prime Minister Erdoğan later became more emphatic concerning the exclusionary and thus 
negative effect of the state-centered kamusal alan. In a speech given on July 9, at the AKP’s Tokat 
provincial congress, he warned not to discriminate among the people by saying such things as “here 
is public and there is not” (Radikal 09/07/2006). 
26The president of the nationalist and pro-Islamic Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, 
also assumed the state-centered definition of kamusal alan when he said on February 14, “the Prime 
Minister’s reaction to the Council of State’s decision that has brought the headscarf ban for the 
public servants beyond the kamusal alan is in essence [his] confession of impotence” (Cumhuriyet; 
Tercüman 15/2/2006).” 
27  At the same time, Arınç revealed his statist interpretation of the society-centered definition in the 
statement that he made immediately following the above quotation, that “it is the state’s duty to 
protect this sphere and to secure rights to its equal use for all citizens.” 
28  In April and May 2007, the secularists mounted an opposition campaign to his election, including 
mass demonstrations and references to warning messages by the military. This triggered an early 
general election in July. 
29  A parliamentary constitutional committee member and Konya parliamentarian, Hüsnü Tuna, said 
that he hoped that the headscarf ban relating to public servants would be lifted too. Isparta Mayor 
Hasan Balaman from the AKP also said that a mayor with a headscarf must also be allowed to hold 
office (Milliyet 28/01/2008). Tuna was later given a warning penalty by his party (Radikal 
15/2/2008). 
30  The effectiveness of frames is in general referred to as resonance. The resonance, or “mobilizing 
potency” (Benford and Snow 2000, 619), of frames/ framing is first examined with reference to the 
credibility and salience of frames. Credibility depends on frame consistency, empirical credibility, 31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and credibility of the frame articulators. The salience of framing to targets of mobilization impinges 
on centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000, 
619-622). The small number of empirical studies on resonance include Zuo and Benford (1995) and 
Koopmans and Ozlak (2004). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1. The Three Frames of the Kamusal Alan Discourse 
   Public sphere definition 
   State-centered  Society-centered 
Public sphere 
perception 
Positive ----  Alternative  counter-frame 
Neutral Dominant  frame  ---- 
Negative    Negative counter- frame  ---- 





Table 2. Ideology of Newspapers and Article Types 
Pro-Islamic Liberal,  catch-all Secularist  Total 
News 53  54  73  180 
(25.9) (28.9)  (51.8)  (33.8) 
Column 152  133  68  353 
(74.2) (71.1)  (48.2)  (66.2) 
Total 205  187  141  533 
(100.0) (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0) 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Newspaper Dataset.   
Note: The association between newspaper ideology and article type is statistically significant 
(Person’s chi-square =28.178, pʻ0.001). 
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Figure 1. Number of Articles covering the Kamusal Alan Topic, 1998-2009 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Newspaper Dataset described in the article.   
 
Figure 2. Shares of Kamusal Alan Definitions in Newspaper Articles 
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Figure 3. Association of the Negative Frame with the State-centered Definition 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Newspaper Dataset.   
 
Figure 4. Association between the State-centered Definition and Pro-Islamic Newspapers 
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